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Levine David
Exceptions to the Clearly Erroneous Test
After the Recent Amending of Rule 52(a)
for the Review of Fact Based Upon
Documentary Evidence
David I. Levinet
Hillary J. Salanst
I. Introduction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides that findings of fact
made by a trial court shall not be set aside by an appellate court
unless found to be "clearly erroneous."' The Supreme Court of the
United States long ago defined this standard to mean that appellate
courts should not set aside the factual findings of the lower court
unless, upon examination of the entire record, the appellate court is
"left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." ' 2 While the courts have agreed that the clearly erroneous
standard only applies to findings of fact and that conclusions of law
are fully reviewable on appeal, almost since the rule's inception the
t Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; A.B., 1974, University of Michigan; J.D., 1978, University of Pennsylvania.
t Law Clerk to Hon. Norma Holloway Johnson, United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, 1988-89; A.B., 1982, University of California at Berkeley;
J.D., 1987, University of California, Hastings College of Law.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). For reviews of the history of the development of the
standard, see Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate Review in
Disparate Treatment Cases-Limiting the Reach of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 58
TUL. L. REv. 403 (1983); Childress, "Clearly Erroneous": Judicial Review Over
District Courts in the Eighth Circuit and Beyond, 51 Mo. L. REv. 93, 97-100 (1986);
Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MiNN. L. REV. 751, 764-
71 (1957); Note, Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary Evidence: Is
the Proposed Amendment to Rule 52(a) the Correct Solution?, 30 VrLL. L. REv. 227,
228-37 (1985) [hereinafter Review of Findings] (and authorities cited therein).
2. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct.
525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766 (1948).
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circuits have split as to whether the standard applies to factual findings
based on documentary evidence. 3
Some appellate courts maintain that factual findings based on
documentary evidence do not involve evaluations of demeanor, 4 and
thus, no reason exists to give deference to the trial court. Other
appellate courts, while accepting the idea that they are in as good a
position as the trial courts to find facts based on documents, do give
some deference to the lower court's reading of the evidence. These
courts reason that although Rule 52(a) applies to findings based on
both documentary and oral evidence, it is easier to reverse a lower
court's findings that are based on documentary evidence. Essentially
these courts apply a less deferential standard of review to documentary-
based findings of fact.5 Finally, the majority of courts contend that
these findings, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, are
still factual and are, therefore, within the parameters of the trial
courts' function. In their view, allowing appellate courts to indepen-
dently make findings of fact would undermine the legitimacy of the
trial courts, encourage appeals, and "needlessly reallocate judicial
responsibility.' '6
In 1985, to quell this debate, the Supreme Court amended Rule
52(a) to provide that "[flindings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."
7
This amendment should end the debate. Nevertheless, some exceptions
to the clearly erroneous rule survive; this article focuses on these
exceptions.
3. "The main unsettled question in the construction of Rule 52 is whether the
deference that must normally be paid to the findings by the trial court applies when
the finding rests on an inference drawn from undisputed facts or documentary
evidence." 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2587
at 740 (1971). See also Notes of Advisory Committee on 1985 Amendment to Rules
(and authorities cited therein).
4. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) provides that "due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses."
5. E.g., Onaway Transp. Co. v. Offshore Tugs, Inc., 695 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.
1983); Marcum v. United States, 621 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1980); Jennings v. General
Medical Corp., 604 F.2d 1300 (10th Cir. 1979); Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State
Bank, 582 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1978).
6. Maxwell v. Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
976 (1982); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 506-07 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de
Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 576 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Sierra Trading Corp., 482 F.2d 333,
337 (10th Cir. 1973); Case v. Morisette, 475 F.2d 1300, 1306-07 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
7. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a) (emphasis added).
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The article begins with a review of the controversy that existed
prior to Rule 52(a)'s amendment, including a discussion of Supreme
Court cases addressing the applicability of Rule 52(a) to findings based
on documentary evidence. The split in the circuits prior to the rule's
amendment follows, with a brief description of the three positions
taken by the circuit courts. The article then turns to the 1985
amendment to Rule 52(a) and the Supreme Court's reaction to it.
Finally, the article addresses the remaining exceptions to the rule that
findings based on documentary evidence must be reviewed under the
clearly erroneous test.
II. Decisions Prior to the 1985 Amendment
A. Supreme Court Decisions
Confusion over the standard of appellate review for non-jury "paper
cases" consisting primarily of documentary evidence motivated the
Supreme Court to amend Rule 52(a) in 1985. Ambiguous and sometimes
inconsistent Supreme Court decisions led, in part, to this confusion
in the lower courts.
The Supreme Court addressed the application of the "clearly er-
roneous" rule to documentary evidence for the first time in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co.8 In this case, the evidence against
the defendants, who were accused of violating the Sherman Antitrust
Act, consisted of over 600 documents and the testimony of twenty-
eight witnesses. 9 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court applied the clearly
erroneous test, even though the evidence consisted primarily of doc-
uments and undisputed facts. The Court stated: "[in so far as this
finding and others to which we shall refer are inferences drawn from
documents or undisputed facts . . . Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is applicable."10
While this language appears to state clearly that Rule 52(a) applies
to findings based upon documentary evidence, some eighteen years
after United States Gypsum the Court hinted at the opposite conclu-
sion. In United States v. General Motors Corp.," which also involved
8. 333 U.S. 364, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948).
9. Id. at 372.
10. Id. at 394.
11. 384 U.S. 127, 86 S. Ct. 1321, 16 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1966).
1987]
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an alleged violation of the Sherman Act, the district court found that
General Motors had not participated in a conspiracy to fix prices.
The Supreme Court, on direct appeal, disagreed and reversed the
district court. Addressing the proper role of the appellate court in
reviewing a trial court's decision, the Court, in a footnote, distinguished
"paper cases" from those based on oral evidence. It stated that
appellate courts may have more freedom in reviewing lower court
decisions where the evidence is primarily documentary than when it
is primarily testimonial. The Court noted that the rationale underlying
Rule 52(a) was to give deference to "the trial court's customary
opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and thus the credibility of the
witnesses."' 2 Therefore, Rule 52(a) "plays only a restricted role" in
these " 'paper cases.' ",1
At least one student commentator has noted that the above language
was dicta; the primary reason for the conclusion in General Motors
that Rule 52(a) was inapplicable was the Court's holding that the
issue on review was one of law and not of fact.' 4 Nevertheless, the
language suggesting that Rule 52(a) was inapplicable because of the
nature of documentary evidence caused confusion in the circuit courts. 5
In 1982, the Court returned to this issue. In Pullman-Standard v.
Swint,' 6 the district court found that the defendants in an employment
discrimination suit did not intentionally discriminate against the plain-
tiffs.' 7 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found discriminatory intent in the
defendant's practices and reversed.' 8 The Supreme Court reversed,
12. Id. at 141 n.16.
13. Id.
14. See Note, Review of Findings, supra note 1, at 239.
15. Compare, e.g., Marcum v. United States, 621 F.2d 142, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1980)
which states:
Where the evidence before the trial court consisted solely of depositions
and other written matter, the court hearing no live witnesses, the burden
of showing clear error is not so heavy as in the case where the court has
the opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses by personal obser-
vation.
with Maxwell v. Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976
(1982) ("We therefore review the district court's determinations as findings of fact,
which, although based solely on documentary evidence, will be set aside only if
clearly erroneous.").
16. 456 U.S. 273, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1982).
17. Id. at 275.
18. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 456 U.S.
273, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1982).
412 [10:409
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holding that the question of intent was a question of fact that clearly
fell under Rule 52(a); therefore, the circuit court could not conduct
a searching review.
The Court in Pullman-Standard said nothing specific about whether
the clearly erroneous rule applies to findings based on documentary
evidence. However, the Court majority observed that "Rule 52(a)
broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain
categories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeals
to accept a district court's findings unless clearly erroneous."' 19
This language can be interpreted to mean that appellate courts
should apply Rule 52(a) when reviewing findings of all types of facts,
including those deduced from documentary evidence. The example the
Court gave after this statement, however, casts some doubt on this
conclusion. The Court proceeded to explain that appellate courts
should not divide facts into those which are "ultimate" and those
which can be called "subsidiary." 2 A discussion concerning facts
based on documentary evidence was conspicuously absent.
Justice Marshall in his dissent, however, squarely addressed the
issue of whether Rule 52(a) applies to findings based on documentary
evidence. While admitting that appellate courts should give deference
to facts based on live testimony, Justice Marshall stated: "[in the
cases before the Court today this usual deference is not required
because the District Court's findings of fact were entirely based on
documentary evidence." ' 2' He cited lower court cases holding that
findings based on documentary evidence do not require the full
deference contained in Rule 52(a). 22
Although Justice Marshall only spoke for himself and Justice Black-
mun, the dissent's existence affects the analysis of the majority's
opinion. In alluding to different types of factual findings, perhaps
the majority was thinking of findings based on documentary evidence
when it held that "all" findings should be given deference under Rule
52(a). Yet the fact that the dissent discussed documentary evidence
may cut the other way; the majority's silence may indicate that they
agree with Justice Marshall's opinion on this point. Thus, the language
in Pullman-Standard can be read as the Supreme Court's approval of
19. 456 U.S. at 287.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 301.
22. Id. at 301-02.
1987l 413
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applying Rule 52(a) to all factual findings, and, indeed, it has been
read as such.23 However, there may be room to argue that the Court
was not thinking of factual findings based on documents when it
made this statement, and that it was in fact providing support, sub
silentio, for the position taken in the dissent.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue again in 1985 in Anderson
v. City of Bessemer City,24 just one month before the effective date
of the amendment to Rule 52(a). Once again, however, the Court left
room to interpret its holding to mean that Rule 52(a) either does not
apply to factual findings based on documentary evidence or that a
modified, less stringent view of the clearly erroneous standard should
be adopted for "paper cases". In Anderson, an unsuccessful female
applicant for the position of city recreation director charged the city
with sex discrimination when it hired a male applicant instead. Al-
though the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, the appellate
court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed because the circuit court
misapplied the clearly erroneous standard. 25 After holding that a finding
of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact subject to Rule 52(a),
the Court ruled that the trial court's finding of intent was not clearly
erroneous within the meaning of the rule.26 The Court also stated that
the clearly erroneous standard applies to findings that are based "on
physical or documentary evidence" 27 and affirmed the dictum in
Pullman-Standard to this effect.
This statement alone would have clarified the matter. However, the
Court went on to say that when the findings are based on a "deter-
mination regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52 demands even
greater deference to the trial court's findings; for only the trial judge
can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that
bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what
is said." ' 28 This passage can be read to mean that a less stringent
standard of review should be applied when factual findings based on
documentary evidence are on appeal than when the findings are based
on the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of live testimony. As
a logical matter, if a greater level of deference is due to findings
23. See Note, Review of Findings, supra note 1, at 240.
24. 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985).
25. Id. at 571-81.
26. Id. at 573.
27. Id. at 574.
28. Id.
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based on live testimony, a comparatively lower standard is required
for findings based on documentary evidence.
Thus, while at first blush it seems that the Supreme Court's consistent
position has been that the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a)
should apply to all factual findings whether based on documentary
evidence or live testimony, there is also some room in the Court's
opinions to conclude otherwise. Indeed, some circuit courts have
responded to the ambiguity in the Court's decisions. Prior to the 1985
amendment to Rule 52(a), the circuits differed on whether they should
apply the clearly erroneous standard to factual findings based on
documentary evidence.
B. Circuit Court Decisions
On the issue of Rule 52(a)'s application to factual findings based
on documentary evidence, before 1985, the circuit courts were divided
roughly into three camps. First, some circuits held that the review of
any finding of fact was uniformly subject to the clearly erroneous
standard. Second, a group of courts applied a modified clearly er-
roneous rule, sometimes referred to as the "gloss approach". These
courts held that when a trial court's findings did not rest on demeanor
evidence, little reason existed to defer to the lower courts' findings;
on appeal, the court could more easily find them to be clearly
erroneous. Third, a group of courts simply did not apply the clearly
erroneous standard of review to facts based on documentary evidence.
They reasoned that they were in as good a position as the trial court
to evaluate such evidence. The ambiguous language of the Supreme
Court's holdings seemed to lend justification to all of these positions.
1. Uniform Application
The first category of Rule 52(a) interpretations were those courts
that uniformly applied the clearly erroneous standard of review to all
findings of fact. The courts held that "the clearly erroneous standard
of review applied to findings of fact even when the district court
relied solely on a written record." ' 29 Courts in the First,30 Fourth,3'
29. Burlington N. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 719 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 1983).
30. See, e.g., Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573 (1st Cir.
1980) (court applied the clearly erroneous standard when much of evidence was
documentary).
31. E.g., Marino Sys., Inc. v. J. Cowhey & Sons, 631 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1980)
19871 415
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Sixth,3 2 Eighth,33 Ninth,3 4 Eleventh,35 and the District of Columbia
3 6
circuits follow this theory.
In justifying this stance, these courts and the commentators who
have supported this position have cited several rationales. First, there
is concern that allowing the appellate courts to fully review the findings
of the lower courts diminishes the esteem and confidence litigants
have for the trial courts.37 Second, the primary fact-finding respon-
sibility (absent a jury) is clearly vested in the trial court. Many believe
that erosion of the clearly erroneous standard will imperil this tra-
ditional delegation of responsibility.3 8 These commentators also fear
(court rejected application of full appellate review to question of infringement of a
patent based wholly on documentary evidence and a comparison of structures of
certain devices); Nalle v. First Nat'l Bank, 412 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1969) (findings
only reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard even though most of the evidence
was documentary).
32. There is some conflict within this circuit on the appropriate standard of
review. Compare United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying
the clearly erroneous standard in a criminal case where there was no oral testimony);
Ingram Corp. v. Ohio River Co., 505 F.2d 1364, 1369 (6th Cir. 1974) ("the clearly
erroneous rule should control even where the entire record consisted of 'depositions
... and other written material' ") with Lydle v. United States, 635 F.2d 763, 765
n.1 (6th Cir. 1981) (court acknowledged in dicta the disagreement within the circuit
over the standard of review and noted that "where the trier of fact has observed
no witnesses, the 'clearly erroneous' test is inapplicable; [the circuit courtl . . . is in
as good a position as the district court to review a purely documentary record and
to arrive at conclusions of mixed law and fact").
33. E.g., Hoefelman v. Conservation Comm'n, 718 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1983)
(factual determinations based upon conflicting depositions are only reviewable under
the clearly erroneous standard).
34. E.g., Maxwell v. Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 976 (1982) (applied the clearly erroneous standard of review even though findings
were based solely on documentary evidence); see also Burlington N. v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 719 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1983).
35. Dothan Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 745 F.2d 1400 (lth Cir.
1984) (clearly erroneous standard applied to findings of fact based upon documents
and transcripts of evidence presented in an earlier action).
36. Case v. Morrisette, 475 F.2d 1300, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (The court stated
that the clearly erroneous test applied even when the findings "are based on inferences
drawn from documents or undisputed facts.").
37. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2587 at
740 (1971); Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 22
A.B.A. J. 533, 540-41, 572 (1936); Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting
Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 505-06 (1950); Clark & Stone,
Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 190, 215-17 (1937); Wright, supra
note 1, at 764-71; Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on
Documentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506, 534 (1963) [hereinafter
Appellate Review].
38. See, e.g., Randall Found., Inc. v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1957).
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that a lower standard of review causes congestion in already crowded
appellate court dockets.3 9 Finally, some argue that the clear language
of Rule 52(a) and the stated intent of its drafters was that it be
applied to all findings of fact.4
2. The Gloss Approach
The second school of thought on the application of the clearly
erroneous rule to findings based on a written record was often referred
to as the "gloss approach". These courts, while applying the clearly
erroneous standard, held that when evidence was primarily documen-
tary, the burden of establishing clear error was not as great. 4' For
example, the Fifth Circuit stated:
[W]here the evidence before the trial court consisted solely of
depositions and other written matter, the court hearing no live
witnesses, the burden of showing clear error is not so heavy as
in the case where the court has the opportunity to assess the
credibility of the witness by personal observation.4 2
The Seventh 43 and Tenth" Circuits also adhered to this theory.
This position found support in several places. First, the language
of the rule as originally written emphasized that "due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses." 45 This language can be read to indicate that special
deference is warranted when the trial court had the opportunity to
weigh credibility, but less deference is needed when the factual findings
are based on nondemeanor evidence. The language in General Motors
39. See WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 761, 778-82.
40. See, e.g., Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 248 F.2d
412, 416 (8th Cir. 1957); Clark, supra note 37, at 505-06.
41. E.g., Marcum v. United States, 621 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1980). Accord
Onaway Transp. Co. v. Offshore Tugs, Inc., 695 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth
Circuit has also referred to this approach as the "hard look" rule. See Bolius v.
Wainwright, 597 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1979).
42. Marcum v. United States, 621 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1980).
43. E.g., Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank, 582 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1978).
44. E.g., Jennings v. General Medical Corp., 604 F.2d 1300 (10th Cir. 1979). As
the trial court's findings were based on documentary evidence, the Tenth Circuit
found that it was "equally capable of examining documents, depositions, and
stipulations, and drawing its own conclusions." Id. at 1305-06. At the same time
the court stated: "Our independent judgment, however, should not be substituted
without regard to the trial court's findings." Id. at 1306.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
19871 417
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also lends support to this reading.4 At least one student commentator
found this the most logical position, 47 demonstrating that this practice
corresponds very closely to the type of review favored historically in
federal equity practice. 48
3. The Frank Rule
The last theory regarding the applicability of Rule 52(a) to factual
findings based on documentary evidence was often called the "Frank
rule." First adopted by Judge Jerome Frank in Orvis v. Higgins,49
some courts held that the clearly erroneous standard simply did not
apply to factual findings based primarily on documentary evidence or
undisputed facts, because the appellate court is in as good a position
as the trial court to determine the facts based upon documentary
evidence. 0
Judge Frank reached this conclusion by relying on language in
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.5 where the Court stated:
The practice in equity prior to the present Rules of Civil Procedure
was that the findings of the trial court, when dependent upon
oral testimony where the candor and credibility of the witness
would best be judged, had great weight with the appellate court.
These findings were never conclusive, however. 52
46. For example, the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that Rule 52(a) "plays
only a restricted role" in cases where the trial court has no "opportunity to evaluate
the demeanor and credibility of witnesses." General Motors, 384 U.S. at 141 n.16.
47. Note, Appellate Review, supra note 37, at 519; see also sources cited supra
note 1.
48. Note, Appellate Review, supra note 37, at 519.
49. 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
50. Judge Frank wrote:
a) If he [the trial judge] decides a fact issue on written evidence alone,
we are as able as he to determine credibility, and so we may disregard
his finding. b) Where the evidence is partly oral and the balance is written
or deals with undisputed facts, then we may ignore the trial judge's
finding and substitute our own, (1) if the written evidence or some
undisputed fact renders the credibility of the oral testimony extremely
doubtful, or (2) if the trial judge's finding must rest exclusively on the
written evidence or the undisputed facts, so that his evaluation of credibility
has no significance. c) But where the evidence supporting his finding as
to any fact issue is entirely oral testimony, we may disturb that finding
only in the most unusual circumstances.
Id. at 539-40 (citations omitted).
51. 333 U.S. 364, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948).
52. Id. at 395 (quoted in Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950)).
[10:409
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Judge Frank read the converse of this statement and concluded that
if the trial judge was not afforded the opportunity to judge the
demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, no deference was due. This
he construed as federal equity practice and concluded that it was the
result intended by the original drafters of Rule 52(a).53 Prior to the
1985 amendment, this position had been strongly supported by Pro-
fessor Moore,5 4 as well as the Second and Third Circuits."
Thus mirroring the Supreme Court's ambiguities, the circuits were
in conflict regarding the application of Rule 52(a) to findings based
on documentary evidence. Most appellate courts held that the rule
applied to all factual findings. Some courts used the gloss approach
and applied the rule to facts based on documentary evidence with less
force. Those courts following the Frank rule believed that Rule 52(a)
did not apply to documentary factual findings at all. This confusion,
in part, led the Advisory Committee to recommend amending the
Rule.
III. The 1985 Amendment
In 1985, the Supreme Court formally amended Rule 52(a) to expressly
provide that findings of fact based on documentary evidence are to
be treated in the same manner as other factual findings and are
subject to the clearly erroneous standard.5 6 The Notes of the Advisory
Committee, moreover, clearly convey the intent to clear up the "con-
flict among the circuits as to the standard of review of findings of
fact by the court," 57 and establish once and for all that "the trial
court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of facts," 58
even if based solely on documentary evidence.
As this amendment is so new, the Supreme Court has had little
opportunity to address its impact. However, in Icicle Seafoods, Inc.
v. Worthington59 the Court addressed the applicability of Rule 52(a)
53. See Note, Review of Findings, supra note 1, at 247.
54. 5A J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 52.04 (2d ed. 1986).
55. See Taylor v. Lombard, 606 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 946 (1980); In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 540 F.2d 601, 603
(3d Cir. 1976).
56. See FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .... ") (emphasis
added).
57. FED. R. CIrv. P. 52 advisory committee's note on 1985 amendment.
58. Id.
59. 475 U.S. 709, 106 S. Ct. 1527, 89 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1986).
1987] 419
HeinOnline -- 10 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 419 1986-1987
AMERiCAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
to undisputed facts. In this case, the respondents were suing the
petitioner to recover overtime benefits under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) for work performed on the petitioner's barge. The district
court found that the respondents were "seamen" under the Act and
as such excluded from overtime benefits. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the question of exemption under the statute was one of
law suitable for review de novo. A majority opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist held that this issue was really a question of fact appropriate
for the trial court. "We therefore reaffirm our holding ... that the
facts necessary to a proper determination of the legal question of
whether an exemption to the FLSA applies in a particular case should
be reviewed by the courts of appeals pursuant to Rule 52(a) .. . .
The Supreme Court found that the appellate court independently
reviewed the facts and reached a different conclusion than the district
court on an important factual question: the "dominant employment"
of the respondents. The Court admonished the circuit court for
engaging in such fact finding.
Justice Stevens' dissent pointed out that the factual findings made
by the circuit court were uncontested facts and therefore within the
parameter of review. 6' In fact, the circuit court stated that one of the
reasons Rule 52(a) did not apply was because it had reversed the
district court based on a reevaluation of undisputed facts as opposed
to resolving a conflict in the witness' testimony, an area clearly within
the purview of trial courts.
Thus, it could be argued that the Court in Icicle Seafoods held that
Rule 52(a) applied because the appellate courts must give deference
to the lower courts' findings of facts when determining the legal
question of exemptions under the FLSA. If true, then the Court was
merely asserting that findings of fact in their application to the law
are for the district court to decide. This issue goes more to the
question of whether mixed questions of law and fact are reviewable
under Rule 52(a), an issue discussed in more detail below. Another
reading of Icicle Seafoods, however, could be that the Supreme Court
frowns on the appellate court making findings different from the
lower court, even when based on undisputed facts. This is how the
dissent reads the majority's opinion. 62 In this light, one could read
60. Id. at 712-13.
61. Id. at 715-16.
62. "The Court chastises the Court of Appeals for supplying a gap in the District
Court's factual findings with uncontested facts .... " Id. at 1530 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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the majority as holding that Rule 52(a) always applies to findings of
fact based on undisputed evidence.
Perhaps the Court is saying both. In any case, together with the
strong, clear language in the Advisory Notes to the amendment, it
appears that the clearly erroneous rule applies to factual findings
based on documentary or undisputed evidence. The conflict in the
Circuits on this issue should cease. Of course, with every rule come
its exceptions.
IV. Exceptions to the Application of Rule 52(a)
A. The "Actual Malice" Exception
The first and clearest exception to the understanding that Rule 52(a)
applies regardless of the nature of the fact finding process concerns
the area of the first amendment. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of the United States, Inc. ,63 a case decided prior to the recent
amendment, the Court held that federal constitutional law required a
de novo appellate review on the issue of actual malice in a defamation
action.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court majority, reasoned that the
issue was one of balancing "two well-settled and respected rules of
law [which] point in opposite directions."' ' On the one hand, Rule
52(a) applies to findings of facts such as the "actual malice" issue
of what a "person knew at a given point in time."' 65 On the other
hand, the Court recognized that the rule also established an appellate
court's obligation to independently examine the entire record in order
to ensure " 'that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion
on the field of free expression.' "6 The Court held that "Rule 52(a)
... does not prescribe the standard of review to be applied in reviewing
a determination of actual malice in a case governed by New York
Times v. Sullivan."'67 While this holding seems only to create a narrow
exception to Rule 52(a), an analysis of the Court's decision facilitates
63. 466 U.S. 485, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984).
64. Id. at 498.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 499 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285, 84 S.
Ct. 710, 729, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 709 (1964)).
67. Id. at 514.
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an understanding of when it may make a similar exception in the
future.
The Court conceded that the intent question involved in an "actual
malice" determination can be construed as a question of fact. 68 In
fact, only a few years earlier, in Pullman-Standard v. Swint69 the
Court held that the question of intent in a discrimination suit was
indeed a question of fact subject to Rule 52(a). 70 Without saying that
it was distinguishing Pullman-Standard, the Court concluded that
because of the special nature of libel suits and their first amendment
implications, it was reasonable to make an exception. The Court
explained this exception in light of the common-law heritage of the
New York Times rule, which grants a particularly broad role to the
judge in applying the law to the facts because the meaning and extent
of the common law can only be discovered by the evolutionary process
of common law adjudication, and because the constitutional values
surrounding the rule are so highly regarded, it was imperative that
the appellate court had an opportunity to independently verify the
decision.7'
Thus, one reading of Bose is that the factual question of actual
malice is so important that the normal clearly erroneous standard
could be set aside, allowing the appellate court to make an independent
review.7 2 Under this analysis, in order to extend the category of
exceptions to Rule 52(a) beyond actual malice, one would have to
maintain that the issue on appeal was similar in nature and importance
to the question of actual malice. Under Bose, it would have to be an
issue concerning a rule which was developed primarily through the
common law, which has been historically judged on a case by case
basis, and which involved a constitutional value.
Language in Bose, however, supports carving out another exception
to the strict application of the clearly erroneous standard to all findings
of fact made by the trial court. In discussing the various standards
of review, the Court in Bose explained that Rule 52(a) does not apply
to appellate courts' review of questions of law, "including .. .a so-
called mixed finding of law and fact."" 3 One commentator argued,
68. Id. at 498.
69. 456 U.S. 273, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1982).
70. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
71. Bose, 466 U.S. at 502.
72. See Childress, supra note 1, at 151 (suggesting a broad reading of Bose).
73. 466 U.S. at 501.
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citing this language, that the Court characterized the question of actual
malice as a mixed question of law and fact, and therefore, declared
it to be beyond Rule 52(a).7 4 While this may explain the result in
Bose, nowhere in the opinion does the Court explicitly say that the
question of actual malice in a defamation case is a mixed question
of law and fact. The Court notes that mixed questions are outside
the scope of Rule 52(a) yet the holding only concluded, without clear
explanation, that the issue of actual malice was outside the Rule. The
Court may have reached this conclusion based on a belief that the
policy considerations surrounding the first amendment were strong
enough, in and of themselves, to warrant an independent review on
the issue of actual malice. 75 Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Bose,
concluded that the majority was carving out an exception to the
"clearly erroneous" rule by treating a "pure question of fact, as
something more than a fact-a so-called 'constitutional fact' ",76 and
not merely ruling that the determination of "actual malice" is a mixed
question of law and fact. 7
To summarize, the first exception to the application of the clearly
erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) occurs when the appellate court
determines the issue of whether the plaintiff satisfied the actual malice
standard in defamation suits against a media defendant; under these
circumstances, appellate courts may conduct an independent review.
It is not clear that in so holding, the Supreme Court declared this
issue to be one of fact and yet outside the rule because of important
policy considerations, or if it held the issue to be one of a mixed
question of law and fact, falling outside the scope of Rule 52(a). In
74. Note, The Future of Libel Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making
Sense of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 477, 488 (1986).
75. At one point the Court even stated that "the 'finding' of the District Court
on the actual malice question could have been set aside under the clearly erroneous
standard of review." 466 U.S. at 514.
76. Id. at 517.
77. In a footnote Justice Rehnquist stated:
[iun attempting to justify independent appellate review of the "actual
malice" determination, the majority draws an analogy to other cases
which have attempted to define categories of unprotected speech, such
as obscenity and child pornography cases .... To my mind, however,
those cases more clearly involve the kind of mixed questions of fact and
law which call for de novo appellate review than do the New York Times
"actual malice" cases, which simply involve questions of pure historical
fact.
Id. at 517 n.l (citations omitted).
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either case, clearly the issue of actual malice in defamation suits
represents one of the exceptions to the strict application of the clearly
erroneous rule. The reasoning in Bose has been extended to apply to
other first amendment protections such as freedom of speech 78 and
freedom of religion. 79 One court, however, explicitly rejected extending
Bose to cases involving commercial speech.80 Thus far the reasoning
in Bose does not appear to have been extended beyond the first
amendment,8 l although it is possible that a court will do so in the
future 82
B. The Mixed Question of Law and Fact Exception
The Bose opinion also concluded that the clearly erroneous standard
does not apply to mixed questions of law and fact, thus representing
a second exception to the strict application to the rule. Two years
before Bose, the Court in Pullman-Standard v. Swint 3 defined mixed
questions of law and fact as "questions in which the historical facts
are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the
issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or ... whether
the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated."
8 4
In the same opinion, the Court admitted the "vexing nature" of the
distinction between law and fact. 5
Thus, the first step in determining whether or not the issue comes
under this exception to the clearly erroneous standard is whether it
78. McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 1985) (In a free speech
case, the appellate court may make independent review of findings of fact.).
79. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 542 n.3 (3d Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534, 106 S. Ct. 1326, 89 L. Ed. 2d 501
(1986) (In a free exercise case, the appellate court stated that Rule 52(a) does not
apply to findings of fact and extended the reasoning in Bose to all cases under the
first amendment.).
80. F.T.C. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 41 n.3 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).,
81. E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2451, 91 L. Ed.
2d 110, 125 (1986) (clearly erroneous rule applied-"no broader review is authorized
here simply because this is a constitutional case"). -
82. See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229 (1985)
(critically assessing wider implications of Bose).
83. 456 U.S. 273, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1982).
84. Id. at 289 n.19.
85. Id. at 289; see also Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671, 64 S.
Ct. 1240, 1243, 88 L. Ed. 1525, 1529 (1944); K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
§ 4.05, at 99 (3d ed. 1972) (characterizing the separation between "law" and
"discretion" as a "zone" rather than a sharp line).
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fits a recognized category of a mixed question of law and fact. Some
clear examples of mixed questions include: (1) deciding in obscenity
cases whether published material appeals to the "prurient interest";8 6
(2) the question in a "fighting words" case of whether the words are
likely to provoke retaliation from the average person 87 ; or (3) whether
in a prior restraint case the "rational inference from the import of
the language" is that it is "likely to produce imminent disorder. '88
Professor Charles R. Calleros, in a 1983 article,89 defined a mixed
question as a "finding that requires refinement or interpretation of a
legal rule in the application of that rule to findings of fact.'"'9 He
helpfully described the problem as a continuum with questions of
clear fact on one end and those of pure law on the other. According
to Professor Calleros, those which should be classified as mixed
questions of law and fact, falling outside of the scope of Rule 52(a),
are those where the historical facts are relatively clear, and the law,
"although 'undisputed' in its abstract formulation, is technical, un-
certain, or bound up with sensitive matters of social or political
policy." 91 These are the types of issues for which an appellate court,
with its responsibility of formulating new legal standards, is particularly
suited.92
Professor. Calleros illustrated his approach by explaining two oth-
erwise conflicting Supreme Court cases: Commissioner v. Duberstein9
and Baumgartner v. United States.94 In Baumgartner, the Court decided
that an appellate court may freely review a trial court's ruling that a
naturalized citizen fraudulently procured his certificate of naturaliza-
tion. This determination required interpretation of an uncertain legal
standard, with important social and political ramifications. Thus, it
qualified as an issue falling into the "mixed law and fact" section
of Professor Calleros' continuum. 91 In Duberstein, the issue on review
86. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2614, 37 L. Ed. 2d
419, 430 (1973).
87. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592, 89 S. Ct. 1354, 1365, 22 L. Ed. 2d
572, 585 (1969).
88. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109, 94 S. Ct. 326, 329, 38 L. Ed. 2d 303,
307 (1973) (per curiam).
89. Calleros, supra note 1.
90. Id. at 425.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 363 U.S. 278, 80 S. Ct. 1190, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1218 (1960).
94. 322 U.S. 665, 64 S. Ct. 1240, 88 L. Ed. 1525 (1944).
95. Calleros, supra note 1, at 428.
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concerned two transfers to taxpayers deemed taxable by the Internal
Revenue Service as income or gifts. 96 The Supreme Court held that
this was an issue of fact, falling within the clearly erroneous standard.
97
Professor Calleros explained the definition of "gift" for income tax
purposes as a fairly certain and definite standard, with factual elements
playing the major role in the final determination. 98 Thus, this issue
fell on the factual end of the continuum and was subject to the
clearly erroneous standard of review.
These examples delineate one useful approach to determine whether
the issue before the court is one of law, fact, or a mixed question.
The scope of this article limits a fuller analysis of these distinctions.99
Once that determination is made, however, the next question is under
what standard the issue will be reviewed. Questions of mixed law and
fact fall outside of Rule 52(a) and can be reviewed independently by
the appellate court.1m° Thus, if one can successfully characterize the
issue on appeal as a question of mixed law and fact, one could obtain
a searching review.' 0'
C. Legislative Facts
Another possible exception to Rule 52(a)'s general applicability is
legislative facts. Legislative facts are, in general, the type of facts
usually relied upon by legislators in justifying new statutes. One circuit
stated that a legislative fact question "is not a question specifically
96. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 281.
97. Id. at 289-91.
98. Calleros, supra note 1, at 429.
99. For further discussion of the distinction between law and fact, see Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. at 286 n.16; K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
§§ 4.05, at 99, 30.01-.02, at 545-47 (3d ed. 1972); Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law
and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1924); Childress, supra note 1, at 145-49, 152-
54.
100. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
501, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1959, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502, 516 (1984); Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66, 78 (1982); Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1715, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 342 (1980).
101. It is possible, of course, that appellate courts seeking to strengthen their
reviewing power may stretch the definition of a "mixed question," thus distorting
the distinction even further in order to get around the strict application of Rule
52(a). See Note, Appellate Review, supra note 37, at 527 (arguing that in the past
courts have stretched issues to fit into questions of law to escape the clearly erroneous
standard of review).
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related to [a particular] case or controversy; it is a question of social
factors and happenings which may submit to some partial empirical
solution but is likely to remain subject to opinion and reasoning."' 0 2
The Supreme Court, in Lockhart v. McCree,10 recently discussed
in passing the proper standard of review for judicial findings of
legislative facts. In Lockhart, a habeas corpus petitioner challenged
the removal of prospective jurors who stated that they could not
under any circumstances impose the death penalty. The petitioner
submitted fifteen social science studies'04 in support of his contention
that the so-called "Witherspoon excludable" principle'05 violated his
rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to an impartial jury
selected from a cross-section of the community. The district and circuit
courts held, apparently based in part on these social science data,
that death qualification of the jury prior to the guilt phase of the
bifurcated trial violated the "fair cross-section and the impartiality
requirements" of the Constitution.' °6 The Supreme Court reversed. In
a footnote, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, written for himself
and four other justices, 0 7 addressed the question of the standard of
review of legislative facts such as the social science studies:
Because we do not ultimately base our decision today on the
invalidity of the lower courts 'factual' findings, we need not decide
the 'standard of review' issue. We are far from persuaded, however,
that the 'clearly erroneous' standard of Rule 52(a) applies to the
kind of 'legislative' facts at issue here .... The difficulty with
applying such a standard to 'legislative' facts is evidenced here by
the fact that at least one other Court of Appeals, reviewing the
same social science studies as introduced by [the petitioner], has
reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Eighth Circuit. 08
This dicta clearly indicates the direction in. which the Court leans
on the applicability of Rule 52(a) to legislative facts.'09 It appears that
102. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983).
103. 476 U.S. 162, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1986).
104. Id. at 168-69.
105. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776
(1967); Comment, Exclusion of Jurors Objecting to Death Penalty, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 162 (1968).
106. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 168.
107. Justice Blackmun only concurred in the result. Id. at 184.
108. Id. at 168-69 n.3 (citing Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 n.7 (4th Cir.
1984)).
109. There appears to be a split in the lower courts on this issue. Compare Dunagin
v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
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this reasoning actually commands a substantial majority on the Court.
The dissent in Lockhart, written by Justice Marshall and joined by
Justices Brennan and Stevens, does not appear to contest Justice
Rehnquist's observation that legislative facts may be independently
reviewed on appeal. In fact, the dissent independently analyzed the
data presented by the respondent." ° It did not take the position which
would have led to the same result: that the trial court's analysis was
not clearly erroneous. Therefore, it appears that at least six sitting
justices support the position that the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review should not apply to legislative facts."'
Scholarly authority supports the Court's apparent view. Professors
John Monahan and Laurens Walker, in a 1986 article completely
unrelated to the Lockhart case," 2 contended that when social science
research and other legislative facts are used to establish a rule of law,
the data should be treated as conclusions of law rather than findings
of fact. Thus, appellate courts should independently review the evidence
as an exercise of their institutional authority."3 The authors contend
that these data are more analogous to "law" than to "fact" because
they have "the same kind of future-oriented generality that case
precedent possesses.""14 It follows that the appellate court should be
free to evaluate de novo any social science evidence introduced at
trial. "A court, for example, should have the discretion to find a
study cited by a lower court insufficiently valid or generalizable, and,
conversely, should be empowered to find methodological virtue in a
piece of research dismissed by the court below.""'
1259 (1984) (finding review of social science "facts" clearly outside of the clearly
erroneous standard) with Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 639 n.25 (D.C.
App. 1979) (finding an appellate courts' re-evaluation of social science studies that
had been introduced at trial to be improper). The California Supreme Court in a
relatively recent case not only reviewed the social science data submitted to the court
as evidence on a Witherspoon issue, but went on to criticize the methodology
employed in these studies. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301,
168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980); see generally Levine & Howe, The Penetration of Social
Science into Legal Culture, 7 LAW & POLICY 173 (1985) (discussing Hovey's sophis-
ticated approach to social science data).
110. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 187-88.
111. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result without writing, therefore it is not
clear whether he accepts Justice Rehnquist's reading of the applicability of Rule 52(a)
to legislative facts. The authors have not found evidence of the opinions of either
Justice Scalia or Justice Kennedy on this matter.
112. Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing
Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. Rav. 477 (1986).
113. Id. at 478.
114. Id. at 491.
115. Id. at 514.
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While a conflict appears in the lower courts regarding the appropriate
standard of review for "legislative facts," the Supreme Court, albeit
in dicta, has indicated that it would treat such data as "law," free
from the constraints of the clearly erroneous standard of review.116
Professors Monahan and Walker, eminent legal scholars, provide
important support for this position.
D. Undisputed Facts
Finally, it should be noted that Justice Stevens dissented in Icicle
Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington,'" contending that the appellate court
should be able to make a finding of undisputed facts not made at
trial so as to promote the " 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation' of civil actions which Rule 52(a) is intended to secure ...
[while at the same time, allowing] appellate courts to give guidance
to trial courts by illustrating the proper application of a new legal
standard in a particular case." 8 Thus, Justice Stevens maintained
that an appellate court may, instead of remanding to the trial court,
make a finding of undisputed facts and apply them to the law.
While Justice Stevens cited no authority, several courts adopted this
position."19 These courts hold that if the "factual" finding made
simply requires applying law to an undisputed fact, then this is the
job of the appellate courts and Rule 52(a) does not apply. However,
if the court must make a factual inference from an undisputed fact,
then this clearly is within the purview of the trial court subject to
the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.120 This position may find
116. The Supreme Court recently passed up an opportunity to clarify this matter.
In Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 437, 93 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1986), the defendant in a products
liability case contended that the trial court based a finding of causation on scientifically
unreliable studies that the plaintiff's expert presented. Rather than decide what
standard of review to apply to a finding of fact based on scientific studies, the
Eleventh Circuit characterized the problem as giving deference to the trial court in
assessing the credibility of the experts presented by both sides. Id. at 745.
117. 475 U.S. 709, 106 S. Ct. 1527, 89 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1986).
118. Id. at 716.
119. See Hillard v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1980); Fahs v.
Taylor, 239 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936, 77 S. Ct. 812,
1 L. Ed. 2d 759 (1957); Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d 592, 594 (3d Cir. 1953); cf.
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670-71, 64 S. Ct. 1240, 1243-44, 88 L.
Ed. 1525, 1529-30 (1944) (distinguishing between findings which require the court to
make inferences from facts where deference is required, and those that require the
application of law to fact with no deference to the lower courts).
120. Calleros, supra, note 1, at 413.
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support in the fact that when Rule 52(a) was amended, no mention
was made of undisputed facts.12 1 Therefore, one may conclude that
the amendment was not intended to prevent appellate courts from
applying law to undisputed facts on appeal.
One student commentator warns of the hazards of this approach.
It is a fine line between applying a legal principle to an undisputed
fact and drawing a factual inference from an undisputed fact.
The danger ... arises from the fact that, since the trial court
must of necessity use legal reasoning in drawing its factual infer-
ences, this rule can also be applied to those inferences which are
traditionally findings of fact subject to the clearly erroneous rule
.... [This] would allow the appellate court to find the important
facts without regard for the trial judge's findings and hence destroy
the proper division of responsibility between the two courts.
Moreover, it would completely defeat the purpose of the rule while
ostensibly complying with it.122
Thus, the exception has the potential to swallow the rule and allow
appellate courts to make factual inferences freely while ostensibly just
applying law to undisputed facts.
Although it appears that there is some support in the circuits for
Justice Stevens' position, there is little support to be found in Supreme
Court opinions. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 23 the Supreme Court
held that if the appellate court sets aside a finding of fact due to an
error of law, it must remand the issue to the district court to apply
the correct legal principle to the fact. The appellate court is not free
to perform this task itself. 24 Interestingly, Justice Stevens concurred
in this portion of the opinion.2 5
Pullman-Standard can be distinguished from Icicle Seafoods in that
the factual finding in the former was not undisputed (as in the latter)
121. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . ." Rule 52(a) (emphasis added). There is
one reference to undisputed facts in the advisory notes. In describing the positions
of the various circuits on the application of Rule 52(a) to documentary findings, the
Notes of Advisory Committee state: "[a] third group has adopted the view that the
'clearly erroneous' rule applies in all nonjury cases even when findings are based
solely on documentary evidence or on inferences from undisputed facts." (emphasis
added). The amended rules make no reference to the express language.
122. Note, Appellate Review, supra note 37, at 528.
123. 456 U.S. 273, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1982).
124. Id. at 293. The Court acted despite Justice Marshall's dissent, which noted
that the lower court did apply the clearly erroneous rule and found that the district
court's conclusions were clearly erroneous. Id. at 295.
125. Id.
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but was a finding of ultimate fact. 126 In Icicle Seafoods, because the
finding was undisputed, there is a stronger argument that remanding
would be a waste of time, as the fact finding process would be purely
ministerial. Allowing the appellate court to make such a finding would
not usurp the fact finding responsibility of the trial court and would
save some time. While this may be a valid distinction which supports
the position that appellate courts should be able to make findings on
undisputed facts, Justice Stevens did not attempt to distinguish Pull-
man-Standard, and was in sole dissent in Icicle Seafoods. Thus, this
may be an exception available at some future date (or perhaps where
it has been adopted) 127 but it probably would not survive the direct
scrutiny of the present Supreme Court.
V. Conclusion
In summary, it appears that the 1985 amendment to Rule 52(a)
clarifies that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies to all
findings of fact regardless of whether they are based on documentary
or oral evidence. The appellate courts must now give deference to the
trial courts' findings of all facts and may set aside such findings only
if, in reviewing the evidence on the entire record, the court "is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."12
Clearly, Rule 52(a) still does not apply to conclusions of law, as it
is the unquestioned function of the appellate court to correct legal
errors. 129 There are several other instances in which Rule 52(a) will
not apply. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc.,1 30 the Supreme Court clearly held the finding of actual malice
in a defamation case fully reviewable by the court of appeals. It is
not clear from the Bose opinion, however, if this is true because
special policy concerns warrant an exception to the clearly erroneous
rule, or if in defamation suits the actual malice issue is simply a
mixed question of law and fact, which is a recognized general exception
to the rule. Of course identifying the issue as one of mixed law and
126. Id.
127. See supra note 109.
128. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 397, 68 S. Ct.
525, 543, 92 L. Ed. 746, 766-67 (1947); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L. Ed. 518, 527 (1985) (if the evidence will
plausibly support two or more conclusions, the trial court's choice cannot be clearly
erroneous).
129. E.g., Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287.
130. 466 U.S. 485, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984).
1987]
HeinOnline -- 10 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 431 1986-1987
AMERIcAN JOURNAL OF TRiAL ADVOCACY
fact is no small task. If the issue is one where the legal theory is
novel and the facts are fairly clear, the issue will fall on the "law"
side of the fact/law continuum and will be reviewable by the appellate
court. The Supreme Court has indicated that it probably will treat
"legislative facts," such as social science data, as issues of law, thus
creating another exception outside the reach of Rule 52(a). Finally,
although Justice Stevens argues to the contrary in his dissent in Icicle
Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington,3' the appellate court probably cannot
apply law to findings of undisputed facts, but instead must remand
to the trial court to perform that task.
Thus, it appears that with the exception of the actual malice finding
in first amendment defamation cases (and perhaps other constitutional
areas in the future), issues of mixed law and fact, and possibly findings
regarding legislative facts, appellate courts in the federal system are
consigned to accepting the factual findings of the lower courts whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, unless found to be clearly
erroneous under the traditional formula.3 2 The appellate courts may
be tempted to apply the exceptions to a greater degree than has been
true in the past, or even to create new exceptions, as they adjust to
life under the amended version of Rule 52(a). 33
131. Icicle Seafoods, 475 U.S. 709 (1986).
132. The Second Circuit, a "Frank Rule" follower, recently indicated that it would
change its position on the deference accorded trial court findings of fact based on
documentary evidence. After the proposed change in the amendment was publicized
but before its passage, the Second Circuit in Nissho-Iwai Co. v. M/T Stolt Lion,
719 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983), citing the proposed amendment to Rule 52(a), called
into question the circuit's practice on granting de novo review to findings based on
documentary evidence. The panel stated that in light of the proposed amendment,
the circuit court should, in the future, defer to the district court's findings of fact.
Id. at 39.
133. See Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 409,
427-28 (1981); Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate
Fact Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Erroneous?,
52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 68, 90-91 (1977) (summarizing why appellate courts attempt
to subtly avoid the constraints of the clearly erroneous rule).
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